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Caroline Bradley
The question of distinguishing between the informational advantages insiders and outsiders may and may not
legitimately exploit in trading in the financial markets is perennial: is securities regulation about achieving a
level playing field for investors or about imposing sanctions for certain fiduciary and fiduciary-like breaches of
duty which go beyond traditional remedies for such breaches. The Second Circuit's decision in US v Newman
emphasizes the fiduciary duty component of liability: at least in a criminal case involving tipping by insiders
"the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed
confidential information and that he did so in exchange for a personal benefit."
In these papers Yesha Yadav focuses on two specific problem areas in insider trading regulation, relating to
trading in credit default swaps (CDS) by lenders and "structural" trading using a combination of preferential
access to information and locational advantages. Both examples present arguments for a rethinking of how
insider trading regulation should address the realities of modem, complex, financial markets.
The contexts of the two papers differ. With respect to Insider Trading in Derivatives Markets, Professor Yadav
is addressing a context in which regulators have decided to extend insider trading prohibitions to derivative
markets. In Structural Insider Trading, on the other hand, Professor Yadav identifies "cracks in regulation" (p.
4).
Congress extended the prohibition of insider trading to transactions in swaps and futures in the Dodd-Frank Act
in 2010 and the CFTC . By 2010 concerns about the risk of
insider trading in credit derivatives was not exclusively a US domestic concern: the Joint Forum of transnational
standard setters for financial regulation had identified this as an issue in 2008. But Professor Yadav persuasively
argues that trading on insider information in CDSs may improve the informational efficiency of the securities
markets, benefiting shareholders. Lenders with access to inside information about their borrowers have
incentives to transfer the credit risk associated with their lending, and their ability to hedge risk encourages
lending, which benefits shareholders "at least in the near term."(p. 416) The story is not all positive, however, as
lender activity with respect to CDSs may harm shareholders, and shareholders have limited capacity to monitor
lenders (p. 417). Lenders may transact in ways that over-emphasize bad news (p. 419).
Professor Yadav suggests that lenders and borrowers might be able to contract around insider trading liability to
fix the doctrinal problem. However, she notes that this fix might not work because corporate debtors suffer from
a weak bargaining position and monitoring a lender's compliance with the terms of a contract would be
challenging. As usual in the insider trading context disclosure could play a role, although a borrower would
have limited options to respond to a lender's disclosed proposed CDS trades (p. 428). Insider CDS trading raises
more general questions about the fit between established doctrine and the realities of the markets: the "tension
between law and reality.. .dismantles long-held assumptions in theory."
Structural Insider Trading similarly focuses on realities of the financial markets to challenge established
assumptions about insider trading law. High speed algorithmic trading strategies combined with geographic
proximity to trading venues provides an informational edge (p5) (of course, this development, together with the
complex harmonization-differentiation picture of financial regulation also challenges some of the thinking about
the decreasing relevance of geography to finance). The informational edge creates a tension between "speed in
trading and the policy goal of ensuring broad and equal access to information."(p 5) Professor Yadav argues:
structural insider trading inverts the traditional policy priority underpinning the prohibition against
insider trading. Under Rule lOb-5, liability is justified as a way to protect insiders despite negative
effects on market efficiency. By contrast, structural insider trading privileges market efficiency
over investor protection, in giving structural insiders the ability to trade on soon-to-be public
information despite costs to investors-at-large.
These are two papers which demonstrate very clearly and usefully a need to rethink one area of financial
regulation for a complex, evolving, market reality.
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